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ABSTRACT
This thesis looks at the informal mechanisms of land
acquisition by low-income groups in the Capital of Honduras,
Tegucigalpa. The mechanisms of land acquisition and illegal
land subdivision are examined in relation to the city's
landownership structure, which is based on privately held
land called the hacienda and publicly held land called the
e2ido. The historical evolution of ejido lands, leading to
its acquisition by private parties, forms the foundation of
the present illegal housing situation in Tegucigalpa. Low-
income groups acquiring privatized ejido land through
invasion constantly claim its former public function. Two
case studies illustrate the role ejido land plays in
organizing land invasion. Invasion is accentuated by both the
tolerance of the political system and the legal ambiguities
behind ejido administration. Government agencies informally
support the process of invasion while a variety of political
organizations identifying themselves with low-income groups
promote their own interests through the legal ambiguities. An
efficient administration of ejido lands for low-income groups
depends on a redefinition of the role ejido lands can play in
the urban development process of Tegucigalpa.
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I N T R O D U C TI O N
During the last two decades, migrants have added to the
growth of Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, at a rate
exceeding twice its natural growth. This trend continues to
increase the demand for space citywide in a pattern which is
more favorable to long established groups than low-income
populations.
While the housing shortage affects almost all income
groups, the shortage of land affects primarly three sectors:
the private, the Government, and the low-income populations.
In their pursuit of shelter objectives, these sectors have
developed under dissimilar conditions. The private and
Government sectors acquire land under the same legal and
economic system. This system is based on official land
regulations and public finance policies.
The private sector acquires land for commercial projects
from private landowners. These projects are directed to
middle and high income groups. In recent years, this sector
has evolved into a system integrating several agents of the
real estate business, such as landowners, planning firms,
construction companies, and real estate firms. The Government
sector also purchases land from individual landowners. It
directs its production to low-income groups.
The land demand of both the private and Government
sectors encourage speculation in undeveloped land, which
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reinforces land acquisition in the third sector, low-income
groups.
Low-income groups acquire land in two ways. In the first
way, land is acquired formally, either through participation
in government projects or through purchase of private
housing. In the second way, access is illegal because land is
acquired outside the formal, legal mechanisms of land
transactions. Direct land invasion, plot-purchase in illegal
subdivisions, and squatting are typical informal ways of
acquiring land.
Tegucigalpa's landownership structure, as it has evolved
through history, determines the dual system of land
acquisition. Landownership falls into two categories: ejido
and Hacienda. Ejido land is public land, administered by the
city Government since colonial times. Hacienda lands are
privately owned estates. Typically, both Government housing
and private housing occur in Hacienda lands, whereas informal
acquisition takes place in Elido lands.
In this paper the dual system of land acquisition is
equated with the legal situation of ejido and hacienda lands.
Hacienda lands have always been legal documented as private
possessions, therefore, haciendas provide the proper land on
which formal, legally based land transactions occur.
On the other hand, ownership of ejido lands has
constantly been challenged. There are two types of disputes
over ejido land; each type of dispute arises from a different
tenure situation. One type includes those ejidos held by the
city government since the turn of the century. These ejidos
have, over time, been acquired by private parties. Presently,
low-income groups claim the public function of these lands;
these groups invade these lands to solve their housing
problems.
The second type of dispute centers on ejido lands which
are encircled by hacienda lands. Currently, low-income
communities of rural origin reside in these elidos. In the
early part of the century, national authorities granted these
communities the rights to these lands by issuing communal
titles. The administration of these lands was the
responsibility of the city government. However, the city
government transferred only parts of these lands to the
communities because hacienda landlords legally opposed
further transfers.
Ejidos of both tenure situations have, over time, been
acquired by private parties through "suppletory title".
Supletory title is based on a legal provision called
"prescription", which states that individuals who have held
ejido land continiuosly for 10 years can acquire legal rights
to the land.
Low-income communities claim these ejido lands from
private parties. These communities assert their rights to
ejido, based on the laws giving right of ejido ownership to
communities, challenging the rights of ejido given to private
individuals through suppletory title. It is the dispute
between these two parties that leads to invasion on the part
7
of low-income groups and illegal land subdivisions on the
part of ejido landowners.
A large percentage of Tegucigalpa's low-income
population has gained access to land through illegal
subdivisions or invasions. Low-income groups can hardly
afford private housing, while the government provides a small
amount of low-income housing in the city. Low-income groups
must resort to informal mechanisms of acquiring land.
This paper focuses on how illegal land subdivisions are
accentuated by both the political and the legal systems. Five
sections divide this paper. Part One reviews the concept of
ejido, the nature of its communal rights and how these rights
relate to low-income communities. Part Two discusses the
acquisition of ejidos by low-income communities and their
administration by the city government. The third part looks
at the process by which landlords acquire ejido lands as
private property, in the context of Government laws. Part
four illustrates 2 cases of dispute over ejido lands, and one
case of illegal land subdivision. The paper concludes with
some policy recommendations.
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P A R T I
EVOLUTIONARY HISTORY OF EJIDO A~ND HACIENDA LANDS
This part reviews the evolutionary history of ejido
lands and haciendas since the Spaniard colonization of
Honduras
A) EJIDO CONCEPT
Ejidos are common use lands. The ejido system of land
tenure was brought to Honduras by the Spanish during their
colonization in the 16th century,(1). Ejidos were allocated
by colonial authorities, the Municigalidad, to local
populations for agricultural or farming activities,(2). The
municipality administered ejidos to local populations for use
as places to live and a means for survival.
The ejido system was merged with the indigenous communal
land system of the Indian population colonized by the
Spanish. The communal system, unlike the common land system
of ejido which implies an ownership right, was based on a
concept of free access to land for native communities. This
concept has been continiously recalled by low-income groups
during their quest for land since the colonization.
----------------------------------------------------------- 
-
(1). The ejido tenure system is typical of feudal agrarian
systems that prevailed in Europe during the middle ages. It
is basically a communal agricultural system, based on an open
field to produce goods and services for the feudal community.
(2). This is the original name of the city government of
Tegucigalpa. During the colony, it was also called 1lcaldia.
I C)
Ejidos played a twofold role in society. Ejidos served
as a land banking system, providing lands for the homes of
local populations. Ejidos also played a welfare role,
providing local populations a source of income. Under the
laws governing ejido lands, each individual of a community
settled on ejido lands had four rights: to use it, to enjoy
its usufruct, possess it, and transfer it to third parties,
given authorization by the city government,(3). City
authorities administered ejidos on the basis of four
principles: Ejidos are inalienable, unprescriptible,
indivisible, and non-transferable. In theory, ejidos can
never be owned by any private party; ejido is a municipal
asset. Native communities were given only the right to settle
on ejido lands.
B) HACIENDA LANDS
Hacienda land have their origin in Royal lands, Baldios
and Realenggs, of the Spaniard colonization. Baldios were
unsettled lands where mining and logging activities occcured.
Realenggs were agricultural estates, next to the cities.,
(see graph #1). Both Baldios and Realengos supported the
colonial economy,(4). Colonial authorities on behalf of the
Spanish Crown, controlled realengs and baldios. Realengos
contained haciendas, the name given to the only buildings,
not land, where the productive activity of the realengg lands
occured.
(3). Under the four rights "possess" means to hold or occupy.
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Prior to independence (181.3), Spain relinquished its
control over baldios and realengos, to the local government.,
ordering the sale of these lands to private individuals.
After independence, Honduran authorities called baldios,
national lands. Hacienda estates replaced realengos as
privately held lands.
(4). Agricultural production in baldios and realengos was
directed to foreign trade and commerce activities.
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P A R T II
AQUISITION OF EJIDOS BY LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES
A) ADMINISTRATION OF EJIDO
In colonial times, ejido rights were granted by the
municipality of Tegucigalpa to both native and Spanish
communities., (5). This Municipality allocated ejido lands to
spanish communities, ggebgs., whenever a city was founded.
Typically, gueblgs were the largest urban unit populated by
Spaniards,(6). On the other hand, native communities were
concentrated in either Realengo or baldio lands, providing
the labor force for the agricultural economy, (see diagram
A). Scattered in the national territory, these concentrations
were called aldeas and caserios, (see map of Honduras).
Although dependent on colonial authorities, they were
socially cohesive, self-governing communities. The colonial
municipality recognized these communities as urban units,
allocating to each community ejido lands.
After independence (1821), realeggos and baldios were
fragmented into private properties. these properties
--- ----------------------------------------------------- 
-
(5). Sapnish communities were called 2yeblos. Native
communities were referred to as comuneros.
(6). The urban hierarchy according to decreasing population
size is:ggeblgs,aldeas and caserios.
municipality recognized these communities as urban units,
LANO TENURE
COLONIAL LANOS
SYSTEM
1. SETTLEO EJIDO FOR PUEBLOS
2. EJIDO FOR CULTIVATION
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O EJIDO OF NATIVE COMMUNITIES
POST-INOEPENOENCE
1. HACIENOA PROPERTY
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+++ AGRICULTURE
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I
2
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K
I
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contained both ejidos allocated by the municipality to the
Spanish and native communities, and private property called
hacienda estates,(7), (see diagram B). Hacienda activities
continued to attract the native labourers which settled
within the Hacienda property. (see diagram C). These
communities eventually became caserios or aldeas, when they
grew to a population size necessary for designations as urban
units. These communities, unlike those concentrated by
colonial authorities, were primarily a labour force hired by
Hacienda landlords. The land provision to these communities
remained, therefore, under direct responsibility of Hacienda
landlords. following the custom of pre-independence these
communities, in view of their population size, requested
ejido rights from the municipality, even though they were on
private hacienda property.
B) WHY EJIDO RIGHTS ARE DISPUTED IN EJIDOS WITHIN HACIENDA
LA~NDS
The ejidos within haciendas were originally settled by
native communities working in hacienda lands. These
communities, over time, became aldeas and caserios. However,
aldeas and caserios on hacienda lands were not legally
recognized communities. These communities cultivated the
adjoining land for their survival and came to regard the land
they worked, and the land in which they lived as belonging to
------------------------------------------------------
(7). Also refered to as sitios or hatos.
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them, (see diagram C). Over generations of settlements on
these lands, these communities developed a strong sense of a
right to ejido.
Under the law governing the creation of ejidos, once
these aldeas had achieved a certain size, they had the right
to claim the territory as their common land, (8). For these
reasons, these communities requested rights to possess these
lands, invoking their right to ejido, from national
authorities. The President or the National Congress granted
these rights in the form of a communal title, (see chart #1).
A communal title meant that the community held the land, not
individuals. The title applied to the settlement and the land
the community cultivated for their survival, (see diagram C).
Over time, as these communities were integrated into the
economy of Tegucigalpa, they needed formerly cultivated land
as land for housing their growing population in the 1960's.
These communities petitioned the municipality to allocate
individual parcels of the formerly cultivated land on behalf
of individuals within the community. However, these petitions
were met by the central authorities. Even though central
authorities granted the ejido rights to these communities,
the Municipality was to be responsible for documenting the
division of the cultivated land into individual parcels.
However, the municipal authorities did not transfer these
lands from the hacienda properties to the individuals of
these communities.
(8). The communities interpreted these laws as if they would
be legally recognized as aldeas.
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The hacienda landlords objected to a granting of ejido
rights to lands within their property. The landlo
title to these lands; they rejected the communal t
to the communities by the central authorities.
The legal theory by which landlords, and
individuals claimed title was "the right of pre
which is a legal doctrine existing in almost all
that will give good title to any person who
occupies and uses a piece of land for a certain
years, even though that land originally belongued
else. The theory of "prescription" is that it
national interest that all land should be out to go
rds claimed
itle given
some other
scription",
countries,
continuosly
number of
to someone
is in the
od use. If
the original owner is not sufficiently interested in his land
that he permits someone else to occupy and use it, them the
occupier should be rewarded for his efforts by being given
title. In Honduran law, continuous use and occupancy without
interference by the former owner gives the right of the
occupant to make a claim in court that the title to the land
be transfered to him.
Although ejido lands, according to pure theory, always
belong to the community, and cannot be subject to the process
of prescription, there is, in Honduras, and in other
countries, a conflict between the concepts of ejido and the
right of prescription. As a result, Honduran landlords and
private individuals used the prescription doctrine to get land
registered in their private names. Representatives of ejido
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communities claim, however, that all these registrations are
illegal since prescription cannot have an effect when it
conflicts with the principle of the inalienability of ejido
property. However, many individuals have used prescription, or
"Suppletory Title" to "legally" acquire specific parcels
within ejido lands the community claimed a right to.
While the dispute over these lands has never been legally
resolved, informal negotiations sometimes result in illegal
subdivisions. Landlords, through their access to the judiciary
system, have retained and subdivided the unsettled lands they
contend are within their properties. These subdivisions are
the subject of part 4.
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P A R T III
PRIVATIZATION OF
OF TEGUCIGALPA
THE EJIDO LANDS
AND COMAYAGUELA
The illegal subdivisions of the ejidos of Tegcigalja
and ComayagUela result from their history of gradual
privatization that is distinct from the history of the aldea
communities claiming ejido rights within Hacienda properties.
just decribed.
The ejido of San Miggel de Teagciga1a is the ejido
where the city of Tegucigalpa was founded during the Spaniard
colonization.
primarly for
city. This
communities,
The ejido of
to a large la
Over time,
designation
became the
independence,
Colonial authorities established this ejido
residential use; it is the first ejido of the
ejido did not arise from a claim of native
but was created for the citizens of Tegucigalpa.
Comayaguela was created later. It was assigned
bour community working in a large realengg., (9).
this community grew to a size appropriate for
as a Pueblo. In 1820, the ejido of Comayaggela
Municipality of Comayaguela. However, since
these two ejidos gradually became privatized ,
(see map #2).
There are three interwoven processes which enabled
individuals to acquire lands within these two ejidos as their
(9). This ejido was created on a colonial hacienda property.
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private properties. The first relates to the ways in which
the city government allocated ejidos to middle-landlords,
(10) The second process leading to privatization is the
succession of agrarian laws enacted by the central
government, and the third is the process of ejido land
acquisition based on legislation protecting land rights of
landowners.
A). ALLOCATION OF EJIDOS TO MIDDLE-LANDLORDS
There are two ejidos which the city government closely
administered since Independency (11). These are ejidos of San
oiggej de egUgcigglga and CgmayagrLgj. The city government
allocated parcels of both ejidos for agricultural purposes to
middle-landlords and low-income groups. Typically, low-income
individuals received small plots, whereas middle-landlords
received large parcels, (see map #2). These allocations were
(10). In this paper "middle-landlords" refers to individuals
holding ejido lands of medium size. They are distinct from
landowners of larger private landholdings.
(11). The administration of these ejidos was originally under
the jurisdiction of separate municipalities. The municipality
of Tegucigalpa administered three ejidos: "San Miguel de
Tegucigalpa", "La Sosa", "La Culebra". The municipality of
Comayaguela administered four ejidos: "Comayaguela", "El
Quizcamonte", "Aldea Mateo", "Cofradia del Crucificado". All
these ejidos were integrated into the city of Tegucigalpa in
1898 when the municipality of Comayaguela became part of
Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras. Yet, each
municipality continued to administer their own ejidos
separately until 1938. The national government elliminated
the municipality of Comayaguela while adjoining the city of
Comayaguela into the municipality of Tegucigalpa. Both cities
were united into the administration called "Distrito Central"
in 1938.
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made conditionally; the allocatees were to return their
parcels to the city government when the lands were no longer
used for agricultural purposes.
Both low-income individuals and middle-landlords did
not, however, return their parcels to the city upon
abandoning agriculture. Middle-landlords retained these
ejidos for two reasons. First, the city government, in an
attempt to solve its fiscal problems, sold these ejidos to
private parties. In the second case, middle-landlords either
transfered or sold to third parties their ejido parcels
without notifying the city government. These transactions
violated the laws governing ejido lands,; ejidos can be
transfered, but not purchased. However, the law governing
ejido lands was superceded by prescription which gives and
confirms ownership rights over land possessed continuosly for
10 years. Third parties, acquired possession rights to these
ejido plots through prescription. Thus, prescription
prevented the city government from reclaiming the ejido
allocations.
B) AGRARIAN LAWS
The progression of agrarian laws from 1877 to 1924 led
to further privatization of the ejidos of Tegucigalpa and
Comayaguela, removing these lands from the jurisdiction of
the city government. (see chart #2). The first agrarian law,
issued in 1877, established the registry office for recording
land transactions in an attempt to regulate the use of ejidos
for both agricultural and mining development. The second
agrarian law, enacted in 1898, decreed that middle-landlords
to whom the city had allocated ejidos were entitled to buy
these ejidos, given authorization of the city government. The
agrarian law issued in 1924 authorized the city Government to
lease ejidos to private individuals on a five-year contract.
However, leasers, like the former middle-landlords who
acquired ejidos for agricultural activities, never returned
these parcels to the city government.
The first registry office, created by the 1877 law,
formalized the possession of ejido parcels allocated by the
city government. The registry office recorded each parcel as
a property. Before this law, there were no records of land
fragmentation except for those records of Hacienda properties
acquired during the colonization. This registry process was
based on several Civil Codes issued by the national
government in parallel to each agrarian law from 1877 to
1906.
CHART * 1
EJIDOS CONTAINED IN HACIENDA PROPERTIES
EJIDO AREA AUTHORIZATION YEAR HACIENDA
Hect.)
La Sosa El Sitio
La Travesia 570 National Congress 1915 El Molino
Villa Nueva 650 President 1894 Tierra Carranza
Suyapa 40 Agrarian Institute 1960 El Trapiche
CHART # 2
LAWS GOVERNING EJIDO LANDS IN POST-INDEPENDEMCE
NAME YEAR RIGHTS TO EJIDO
Ley Reglamentaria de Tierras 1835 Use, usufruct and
Ley Reglamentaria de tierras 1836 1 possession under
Decreto Ley 1646 1 direct control of
Decreto Ley 1870 1 the Municipality.
Ley de Agricultura
Ley de Agricultura
Ley Agraria
Ley de Municipalidades
1877 1 Purchase by private
entrepreneurs
1898 Purchase by citizens
1924 1 Lease
1927 1 Possession upon
paying taxes.
SOURCE: Gomez, Martinez, "La Tenencia de 1a Tierra en
TegucigaiIa" (1979).
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C) LEGISLATION PROTECTING LAND ACQ.UIRED BY MIDDLE-LANDLORDS
AND LOW-INCOME INDIVIDUAILS
The civil codes protected middle-landlords and low-
income individuals' rights of possession on the basis of a
legal provision called "Prescription". As described above,
this provision of the civil code allowed parties to acquire
ownership rights whenever the land had been continuously held
for ten years.
The process of registry of these lands favored middle-
landlords over low-income individuals holding small plots
within the ejidos of Tegucigalpa and Comayaguela. When the
ejido parcels were alocated originally to both parties, the
city government was unable to precisely survey these
allocations. Due to the lack of official boundaries, middle-
landlords were able to claim lands in excess of the original
parcel allocation. Not only were these excess lands taken
away from the municipality, which could have eventually given
these lands to low-income communities, but low-income
individuals could not effectively claim the right to their
small parcels.
In an attempt to register lands equitably, the ministry
of Justice published the auction of rights in the government
journal called, la Gaceta. This journal could assure that
low-income individuals would be able to dispute claims made
on their plots by middle-landlords. However, most of these
individuals are unfamiliar with the process of public action.
D) SUMMARY
Tegucigalpa's urban growth, has taken place in seven
ejido lands., and over 20 private properties containing
haciendas. Since the colony., the city government has
administered three types of ejidos, (11). The first, type
includes three ejidos assigned to labourer communities living
in aldeas such as Mate., Quizcamonte, QCfradia del
Crucificado. These ejidos will not be discussed in this paper
because they are not relevant to a discussion about ejido
dispute in the city. The second type includes ejido lands
assigned to labour communities within private properties in
post-independence years by the city government. These
communities were attracted by agricultural activities in
Haciendas. These ejidos are: La Sosa, LA Travesia., La
Culebra/Villa Nueva, and Suyyag. Respectively, these ejidos
are in Hacienda El Molino., Hacienda el Sitio., Hato de Enmedig
and Hacienda el Tra2iche, (see map #2).
The third type includes ejido lands created during the
pre-independency period, are not contained within hacienda
properties. These pre-independence ejidos were allocated to
local populations for residential and agricultural purposes.
They are the ejido of "Comayaguela"., which became a separate
municipality shortly before independence in 1820., and the
ejido of "San Miguel de Tegucigalpa"., (12). These ejidos
(12). This is the ejido on which Tegucigalpa city was founded
in 1574.
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contain over seventy percent of illegal land subdivisions in
the city. Illegal subdivisions in these ejidos result from
their privatization from 1877 to 1975.
During the last decades, low-income groups constantly
challenge the privatization of the ejidos of Tegucigalpa and
Comayaguela. They organize invasions, claiming the social
function of ejido lands. The privatization of both municipal
ejidos and the ejidos of aldea and caserio communities within
haciendas form the foundation of the present illegal housing
situation of metropolitan Tegucigalpa.
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P A R T IV
THREE CASE STUDIES
Illegal land subdivisions date from the late 1940's.
Their predominance coincides with two factors. The first
factor is increased migration to the city as agricultural
activity in the northern region of the country slowed down,
as mining activities in Tegucigalpa's hinterland declined.
The second factor relates to the virtual total privatization
of ejidos of "Comayaguela" and "Tegucigalpa".
Middle-landlords are the main developers of illegal
subdivisions since the early 1950's because they had acquired
large parcels of ejido lands. Increased migration increased
the demand for these ejido lands which had been acquired by
middle-landlords in previous decades. Middle-landlords were
able to sell the land at low prices because they did not
provide either infrastructure or services. These developments
violated city regulations which had established land
subdivision norms. These subdivisions are "technically
illegal" because they violate land regulations. Unlike low-
income communities in ejido lands within hacienda properties,
low-income groups who purchased plots from middle-landlords,
do not dispute ejido privatization because of their migrant
origin. These groups find instead, a ready solution to their
housing problem in illegal subdivisions, or through invasion
and squatting in other's lands.
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Each acquisition mechanism occurs in different land
types. Squatting occurs on public lands of marginal value
along river banks or steep hills, with high risks of
landslides or floods. Invasions, occur in both public and
private lands. Illegal, commercially subdivided developments
take place in properties once held by middle-landlords, (see
photo #1).
During the last decade, low income groups have
constantly challenged the privatization of the ejidos of
Tegucigalpa and Comayaguela. They organize invasions.
claiming the social function of ejido lands. The
privatization of these ejidos and the dispute over the ejido
rights by aldea communities, within hacienda result in
illegal land subdivisions.
The following section looks at three case-studies
illustrating illegal land subdivisions and land invasion,
from the 1950's to the 1980's.
CA~SE #* 1: COLONIA EL REF'cARTO
Illegal, commercially subdivided developments take place
in two types of land. The first type occurs on middle-
landlords properties dismembered from ejidos of Comayaguela
and Tegucigalpa. The second type include private lands of
marginal value, namely those dismembered from the private
property called "Labradores de la Plazuela", (13).
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Colonia "El Reparto" is an example of illegal,
commercialy based subdivision, (see map #3). It is a pioneer
development undertaken by a small private real estate firm.
City authorities consider this development illegal because it
does not comply with city regulations. The dispute over this
subdivision arose from the inability of city authorities to
force the developer to provide the site with services and
infrastructure. The developer has constantly refused to meet
the request of authorities based on official documents
attesting to the provision of services on the site. For
example in 1950, three agencies, the city government, DC, the
water company (SANAA) and the electricity company (ENEE),
issued documents stating the developer's compliance with
urbanization norms.
At the creation of a community development unit, the DC
questioned these documents in the mid-seventies. The
community development unit surveyed the site and found a lack
of basic services in the site. The DC asked then the
developer to provide the basic services, yet this petition
was unsuccessful. Again, the developer refused to meet the
request questioning the validity of the documents issued by
past city authorities.
The individuals who purchased plots in "El Reparto"
have, however, managed to bring electricity and water to the
site on their own, while the developer continued to sell
additional plots in the adjoining land without supplying the
services and road infrastructure.
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Continued violation of city regulations and land use
norms suggest the inability of city authorities to exert
control over illegal developers. Illegal subdivisions provide
housing for low-income groups. While illegal subdivisions are
in effect sanctioned by city authorities, they also provide
housing for low-income groups.
CASE # 2: ALDEA "LA SOSA" AND CASERIO "LA TRAVESIA".
Aldea "La Sosa" and "La travesia" illustrate the case of
how low-income communities settled on ejido lands contained
in hacienda properties. These communities have a similar
history because of their location on the same ejido.
Originally, both these communities were formed by labourers
working in hacienda estates. The community of aldea La Sosa
worked in hacienda "El Sitio", whereas communities of "La
Travesia" worked in hacienda "El Molino".
Both haciendas are located in the northwest part of the
city, (see map #4). Hacienda "El Sitio" was surveyed in 1856
and registered as private property in 1892. Hacienda "El
Molino" was surveyed in 1900 and registered in 1915 as
private property, (14).
Both communities are documented as belonging to the
-------------------------------------------------------------
(13). This land was eventually acquired by both low-income
communities and middle-landlords through purchase from. the
city government. It was not registered as ejido land., yet it
was partly acquired by native communities living in aldeas.
(14). The ejido title of "La Sosa" was also registered in
1915.
MAP No 4
landholdings
LA SOSA
LA TRAVESIA
3 SUYAYA PA
4 VILLA NUEVA
H HACIENOA LAND
e EJIDO LANO
34
1
2
municipality of Tegucigalpa in 1895. These communities
underwent rapid growth in the early century and they
requested ejido rights from the municipality. This petition
was met instead by the National Congress which authorized a
communal title in 1915. The title was registered by the
municipality of Tegucigalpa in the following year.
In a period of over 40 years beguining in 1916, several
settlements sprang up in the formerly cultivated land of this
ejido, as their communities became gradually integrated into
the economy of the city. Some of these settlements, called
barrios and fraccionamientos, were undertaken by either the
municipality, the DC (15), in charge of administering the
ejido title or by the hacienda landlords.
There is no single pattern of negotiation that took
place between the community, the DC and landlords. Land in
this ejido has been acquired through several methods ranging
from direct negotiations between the community and hacienda
landlords, to outright invasion. Typically, land subdivision
in this ejido has occured at the request of individuals in
the community from the hacienda landlords. In some cases, the
community purchased the land. In other cases, the DC has
subdivided part of the land granted by hacienda landlords, at
the petition of the community board, the gatronato which
represents the community in the city government.
(15). Since Independence, the city government has changed its
name from "Alcaldia" to "Municipalidad", to "Distrito
Central", (DC), in 1938, to "Concejo Metropolitano del
Distrito Central", (CMDC), in 1975.
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National authorities., such as the Ministry of Justice,
intervened in cases of invasion mediating between the
community and the hacienda landlords. The Ministry of Justice
and Government, settled a dispute between the community board
of each aldea and the hacienda landlords in 1960. The
community board requested from the DC the adjoining lands to
house their growing population. As the DC was unable to
respond to this petition, the community board resorted to the
Ministry of Justice for support. The Judiciary served as the
mediator between landlords of both haciendas to meet the
communitys's requests. Landlords of both haciendas resolved
the conflict, donating to the community some of the adjoining
land the commmunity requested. Yet, landlords assigned the
transfer of this land to the DC. The dispute remained
unsettled since the DC transfered less than 6% of the total
donation in 1975. The 94% of this donation remained unchecked
by the DC and was later acquired by private parties.
While the dispute has remained unsettled due to the
ineffective administration of the DC, the communities have
prompted many invasions in the area, since 1975. Invasions
occur to reclaim both the land rights assigned to the
community in 1915, and the land the DC failed to transfer to
the community since 1960. These invasions are usually
sponsored by several agents including political parties,
university students and labour unions. Recent migrants often
join local communities in invading these lands. These groups
join the invasion to solve their housing problem.
As in previous occasions, invaders use the invasion
method to negotiate the land price directly with the hacienda
landowners. The communities organized around the Board, have
often been able to negotiate the land in good terms.,
purchasing the land at a price suitable to their economic
situation.
CASE #3: INVASIONS ALON6 THE REGIONAL HIGHWAYS
Land invasion in the mid-seventies occured as a result
of three factors. The first factor was the steady migration
resulting from increased activities in the building industry.
The second factor was political. Political parties encouraged
invasions as part of their campaigning platforms. The third
factor was the increase in dispute over the ownership of
ejido lands at the periphery.
The three factors are interwoven. Migrants in finding
limited opportunities in the landmarket, resort to invasion
with the covert support of political activists. The political
base on which migrants rely on includes: political parties,
labour unions, federation of community boards, and university
students. Over thirty invasions along the city's regional
highways, (16), (see map #5), and other parts of the city, are
attributed to both political campaigning and the
------------------------------------------------------------
(16). These highways are: "Carretera a Santa Lucia",
"Carretera al Zamorano/Danli"., Carretera a Rio Hondo/El
Norte"., and "Carretera a Talanga".
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strengthening of labour unions and community organizations.
These organizations led migrant populations to reclaim
ejido lands incorporated into the urban limits of the city
from 1976 on. These organizations inform low-income groups
about the nature and public function of ejido lands, thus
encouraging migrants to assert their social right to a
public good and reject the acquisition of ejidos by private
parties.
Invasions motivated by the renewed dispute of ejidos,
occured along the highways linking Tegucigalpa with its rural
hinterland. The dispute over the ejido lands centered on
lands belonging to the old ejido of "Comayaguela". The
fragmentation and privatization of this ejido has occured
since the early century. Yet, in the late seventies,
political activists organized invasions along the highway
linking Tegucigalpa to "Talanga", to challenge the
acquisition of these ejido properties by private individuals.
Political activists informed the Federation of community
boards about the process by which middle-landlords documented
their possessions. Eventually, middle-landlords sold parcels
of their property to either private individuals or government
agencies, to escape the threat of invasion.
Two invasions, "Las Pavas" and "Amate", illustrates the
invasion of low-income groups on public lands, (17), (see
photo #2). The community board of these groups invaded a
---- ------------------------------------------------------
(17). This invasion took place in a former ejido land,
eventually acquired by private parties and lately acquired by
INVA.
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site held by the National Housing Agency, (INVA). These
groups had the support of political organizations. Activists
of the Federation of Community Boards informed invaders about
the legal situation of the land they intended to invade. The
promoter rewarded the invaders with a plot on the site while
requesting from them a fixed fee and the commitment to remain
in the site until the threat of eviction was withdrawn.
The invasion was tolerated by the authorities. INVA
eventually negotiated the settlement with the invaders, later
INVA provided technical assistance from its social service
Department, helping to organize the community to improve
their settlement and bringing water and electricity to the
site. It is the tolerance of public authorities that
encourage established members of invasion settlements to
continue invading the adjoining lands. The invasion of
"Colonia Villafranca" was initiated by the community boards
of both the "Amate and "Las Pavas". But the land they invaded
was privately held. The landowner challenged the invasion,
although he failed to prove the ownership of the land. There
are several claimants over the ownership of this site having
legal titles. Yet, the confusion about the actual and true
owner is compounded because the claimants's titles derive
from different properties, making it difficult to establish
the rights of each claimant.
The invaders negotiated with the landlord over
compensation. However, the landlord refused to accept the
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offer and contrary to an appraisal of the DC, the landlord
contended that the land had a higher value than the amount
the invaders offered. The dispute has remained unsettled as
no agreement has been reached. This situation has left the
invaders under the threat of eviction, even when utility
companies, the DC and INVA, have provided the site with
electricity and water services
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CONCLUSIONS
Illegal land acquisition takes place on ejido lands in
Tegucigalpa due to the ambiguity in legally defining the
"social function" of ejido, overlapping administrative
responsability of ejido land, and the government's lack of
clarity on the role of ejido lands in the urban context.
Low-income groups have limited opportunities in
government programs. However, through invasion, low-income
groups can gain access to land. These groups legitimize
invasion by reviving the communal concept of ejido land.
Political organizations exploit the ambiguity of the legal
status of ejidos, encouraging low-income groups to invade
these lands held under varying tenure situations. Invasion
merges the ambiguity of the law with the cultural concept of
free-access to land.
Simultaneously, agrarian and administrative laws support
the cultural value of ejido lands by evoking its social
function. However, these laws define ejidos's social function
ambiguously. Both the city government, CMDC, and the
National Agrarian Institute (INA), have laws defining
ejidos's social function with different criteria. The CMDC
defines "social function" by defining under what conditions
land is not performing its social function. These conditions
refer to situations when ejido lands are vacant, illegally
subdivided and serviced, and subject to landslides. To
INA, ejidos are providing a social function when they are
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being used for agriculture. The ambiguity of the legal
definition of the social function of ejido lands is
compounded by overlapping jurisdiction of institutions
dealing with the administration of ejidos. Some ejido lands
contained within the city's urban limits are still under the
jurisdiction of INA. The lack of admnistrative instruments
needed to transfer urban ejido lands to the CMDC restrict the
jurisdiction of the CMDC law governing ejido lands.
The urban history of ejido lands, specifically the
development of overlapping uses and conflicting ownerships,
affects the value of land in the City. The agrarian law fails
to state the urban function of ejido lands in metropolitan
areas.. This allows middle-landlords to maintain their
possession of ejido lands at the periphery of the city by
claiming that they were being cultivated. In so doing middle-
landlords constrain the supply of land for residential uses
while preventing the CMDC to decide on the use of these
lands.
Conflicting ownership lowers land values in two ways.
First, it prompts landowners to sell the land illegally,
avoiding the lengthy judiciary process of clarifying actual
ownership. Second, it encourages landowners to subdivide
their land illegally, anticipating the threat of invasion by
low-income groups. Illegal land subdivisions benefit both
landlords and low-income communities. Landlords extract land
rent with minimum capital investment; they escape city
regulations and do not provide basic services and
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infrastructure. Low-income groups receive land at low-cost
through invasion and their presence automatically lowers land
values.
The political network of organizations, parties, and
community boards support the actions of both invaders and
illegal developers. Political connections enable developers
to escape the government requirements for provision of basic
services. It is the pressure from the community boards which
leads utility companies and city authorities to legitimate
the process of illegal land acquisition by providing basic
services and helping the invaders to upgrade their
settlements.
Low-income groups demand access to ejido lands because
it is considered a public good whose social function they
equate with a right to own it. The National government,
through The Agrarian Institute (INA) and the city Government
(CMDC), should allocate these ejidos to low-income groups.
Yet, the process of ejido privatization is not contradictory
to a social function because middle-landlords have subdivided
the land for use by low-income groups. Illegal land
subdivisions provide a housing alternative to low-income
groups. This alternative is however, not the optimal one
since the subdivisions are not provided with basic services.
Illegal subdivisions usually take place in sites where the
provision of services and road infrastructure is either
technically irrational or requires large capital investments.
The city government, as well as housing agencies work on
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small budget; they are unable to commit their limited
resources to all illegal settlements in the city.
City authorities should therefore, control the sprawl of
illegal land subdivisions and invasions to allow the city to
grow in an ordered and planned process. This control calls
for long-run and short term land-use planning. Short-term
planning policy recommendations concern existing unserviced,
illegal subdivisions and invasions. Long-run planning
concerns the development of ejido lands at the periphery of
the city.
SHORT TERM PLANNING
Short term plannning in land development falls into the
area of housing upgrading. During the last decade, low-income
populations living in illegal subdivisions or invasion
settlements, have put an additional pressure on services such
as water, electricity and sewage. This demand for services
calls for a switch in emphasis on housing provision from
construction oriented policies to service provision. Service
oriented policies should consider the following aspects:
1) Securing tenure for the majority of households in
invasion settlements.
2) Assigning top priority to trunk infrastructure
programming and capital investments within illegal
settlements.
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3) Extending credit mechanisms in the housing sector both for
upgrading and for housing construction in illegal
settlements.
4) Extending technical assistance in the areas of settlement
design, housing construction, community organization and
legal aid.
Upgrading programs, will improve the living conditions
of a large percentage of low-income groups, and allow the
city government to incorporate these populations into the
city's tax base. Yet, city authorities should supplement a
service oriented policy with a long-term policy on ejido
lands. Revising the role of the city government in planning
for the use of ejido lands is central to access to land by
low-income groups.
LONG RUN PLANNING
Currently, the CMDC lacks the technical capacity to
administer ejido lands for urban uses. The social function of
ejido lands needs to be translated into an urban function
through institutions which are able to allocate ejido lands
according to population growth projections and other urban
land requirements.
To increase the technical capability of the CMDC will
require an urban development law which would assign top
priority to the efficient allocation of ejido lands. In
achieving efficiency goals, the CMDC would assume a developer
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role controlling the development and servicing of ejido lands
within the boundary of the city. As a developer, the CMDC
will be able to finance service and infrastructure provision
in all lands having a potential for residential use.
An urban development law prescribing urban uses for
ejido lands would allow the CMDC to acquire the "development
rights" over these lands. The CMDC would make the most
efficient allocation of these lands based on its own
projection needs and programs. In using its "rights of
developments"., the CMDC would earmark areas for residential
developments. These developments may be undertaken either by
ejido landholders or the CMDC. In other words, the CMDC will
assign ejido lands for low-income housing while allowing
landholders to retain the rights of possession over ejido
lands, leased to them by the National Agrarian Institute
(INA). The right to retain ejido land must be based on a
valuation system establishing land prices and a compensation
mechanism. A compensation mechanism would allow landholders
to purchase ejido lands while supplying this land for low-
cost housing. Yet, the valuation system needs to be
supplemented with cadastral and registry offices controlling
the efficient allocation of land for tax-purposes and
avoiding ownership disputes.
In a second alternative, the CMDC would purchase the
ejido land from the landholders, compensating them for the
improvements made on their sites according to the valuation
would assume an entrepreneurial role, producing and
allocating serviced land.
Yet, this alternative needs to be assessed against
administrative costs resulting from the organization of the
CMDC as a Development corporation. Given the potential
increase in administrative costs resulting from the CMDC
assuming a developer role, landholders developing their own
land for low-income groups is a more feasible strategy.
Private landowners would be able to develop the land for low-
income groups if the CMDC was able to negotiate low land
prices. This would make it attractive to landholders to
engage in housing developments.
Yet, the ability of private landowners to provide this
land for low-income developments is dependent upon the use of
flexible urbanization regulations which will lower standards.
These standards should allow the gradual provision of basic
services, without forcing developers to provide all
infrastructure and services at once. Lower standards would
allow a larger number of landholders with no access to
capital finance, to engage in low-cost developments.
Increased land supply, would then, generate a wider range of
opportunities for low-income groups in formally acquiring
land in Tegucigalpa.
The viability of the above policy recommendations is
currently dependent upon both the legal and administrative
systems governing ejido lands. The ineffective administration
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of ejido lands will continue to encourage land invasion and
illegal land subdivisions unless, the function of ejido lands
is redefined for the urban context. This redefinition implies
the integration of ejido lands into a legal framework stating
its specific role in the urban development law. This law
would assure a long-term supply of land in Tegucigalpa for
all urban uses.
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